Intelligence and Security agencies and officials have noted a massive shift in the modus operandi of terror handlers operating in and from outside Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), who are now focusing on radicalising individuals to carry out “self-styled” terror activities across India.
As per information, terror outfits are increasingly using online platforms and other means to radicalise local youth and professionals, who are not in the records of officials, and encouraging them to act independently or in small terror modules rather than as part of large, established groups with huge weaponry.
A recent “white-collar” terror network dismantled by J&K Police involved doctors and a former paramedic-turned-imam, proving the doubt of agencies about a shift from the traditional recruitment of individuals with prior separatist or criminal links to white collared have no track record to create terror activities and not only in J&K but pan-India.
A top intelligence official said that handlers are warier of recycling former terrorists due to increased surveillance and are instead targeting recruits with no prior links to terrorism or a criminal past, making them harder to track through conventional intelligence methods.
He added, “The goal of these radicalised individuals appears to include carrying out attacks across India as evidenced by an explosives-laden car module linked to a recent Delhi car blast.”
The J&K Police have identified numerous social media handles involved in this radicalisation, and the handlers are reportedly using encrypted messaging apps to issue instructions.
The official added that those terror handlers have shifted their focus to a self-radicalisation policy primarily to minimize their own operational risks, maximize the unpredictability of attacks, and leverage modern digital technology for recruitment. This strategy allows for more resilient and harder-to-detect terrorist networks.
The self-radicalised individuals, often referred to as “lone wolves” or members of small, isolated cells, generally have no direct, formal contact with a larger terrorist organization’s hierarchy or established members. This lack of a traditional command structure makes them extremely difficult to track using conventional intelligence methods that rely on monitoring known networks or communications.
These individuals use readily available materials, household chemicals, everyday vehicles, and public spaces to plan their attacks, reducing the need for significant funding, complex supply chains, or secure training camps required for large-scale operations.
Those self-radicalised individuals have high-paying jobs and are willing to use their own finances to procure equipment and plan attacks, eliminating the need for handlers to transfer large sums of money, which often leaves a financial trail for authorities to follow.
While many of those attacks may be less sophisticated, but can still have a high psychological and physical impact. If the individual is caught, they have minimal organisational secrets to reveal, protecting the broader network from exposure.
The internet, especially social media, encrypted messaging apps, and online forums, allows for rapid exposure to extremist propaganda, as seen in white collar terror module and it shorten the time from initial exposure to an attack from months to mere weeks in some cases.
Handlers target individuals who may feel a sense of alienation, perceived injustice, or a need for identity and belonging, using online content to reinforce grievances and encourage them to act independently. These autonomous actors can operate across wider geographical areas without prior links to known local terror history, making the location and timing of their attacks highly unpredictable for security agencies.
This shift has created a complex and evolving challenge for counter-terrorism agencies across India.
Indian intelligence and security agencies consider this new modus operandi of self-radicalisation attacks to be a highly dangerous and challenging development in the country’s internal security landscape.
The shift in strategy has prompted high alerts and calls for a revised counter-terrorism approach.
The primary danger lies in the difficulty of detection. Traditional intelligence methods relying on human informants or intercepting communications between a network are less effective against individuals who plan and execute attacks in isolation, using “do-it-yourself” methods.
These individuals can strike anywhere across India with little or no warning, making the location and timing of attacks highly unpredictable. This broadens the threat beyond traditional disturbed zones like J&K.
The emergence of educated professionals like doctors and paramedics, engineers, nurses, pilots, and security personnel can be involved in these modules, which is particularly alarming. These individuals often have no prior criminal or separatist history, enabling them to operate without raising suspicion, thus forming an elusive new terror network.
The sophisticated use of encrypted messaging apps and online propaganda allows handlers to radicalise individuals remotely while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding a digital trail, a major challenge for surveillance agencies.
This new form of terrorism requires a multi-layered approach that includes advanced cyber-forensics, intelligence sharing, ideological disruption, and community-based resilience, as kinetic responses alone are insufficient to counter homegrown radicalism.
Overall, Indian agencies view this as an evolution in terror strategy that represents a new reality of the internal security paradigm, requiring a significant shift in intelligence gathering and prevention efforts.


